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Free college programs have proliferated at the state and local levels over the past decade, focused
primarily on the nation’s community colleges. President Biden’s $1.8 trillion American Families
Plan includes funding to make community college tuition free for participating states, and the idea
of federally supported tuition-free four-year public college education is also back in the spotlight.
It is easy to see why: “free college” fits on a bumper sticker, and it offers a simple message that
signals to low-income families and first-generation students that achieving a valuable postsecondary credential is possible for them. This can lead families to prioritize education earlier, in
the middle school years, when young people are developing the skills needed to succeed in high
school and college. It can also support the growing number of adult learners by reducing one
big uncertainty about the cost of returning to pursue a college degree. Making a public college
education tuition-free can indeed enhance access and covering non-tuition costs of college can
also aid in completion.
But behind the bumper sticker, free college is rife with implementation, efficacy, and equity
issues. Over time, free college programs may further erode the resources available to the nation’s
most under-resourced institutions. Evidence from the COVID recession shows how this may
play out. Free college proposals also create winners and losers among the states. When coupled
with a lack of political will to budget for free college in a narrowly split Congress, policymakers
should pursue alternative solutions that are more socially equitable, economically efficient, and
politically viable.
There is a better mix of policy prescriptions that can achieve access and success for students
most in need of federal support. Increasing the Pell Grant will target aid to students most in
need without breaking the bank. Giving states that invest in their own higher education systems
a block grant and subsidizing non-profit institutions with a history of success supporting lowincome students will reward those trying to ensure access and success for low-income students.
Establishing simple accountability measures that affect all schools will reward institutions that
support students while reining in those that act in bad faith. A targeted, multi-faceted strategy
has a greater chance of succeeding in politically volatile times, and offers future generations of
students the nuanced, long-term college affordability compact they deserve.
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The State of Free College Programs in the States
The 2008 financial crisis punctured state budgets, leading to higher tuition sticker prices at
public institutions and more student debt. The rapid proliferation of college promise programs
during the nation’s economic recovery shows one attempt by states and localities to tackle the
student debt crisis and the rising cost of attendance. These programs “promise” a tuitionfree college education to students who meet strict eligibility requirements and live in defined
geographical areas. Generally implemented at the local level (as with Kalamazoo Promise in
Michigan and Knox Achieves in Tennessee) or the state level (such as the Tennessee Promise
and Oregon Promise programs), promise programs receive primary funding from state or
local tax revenues or endowed private funds.1 Most focus on community college students, with
very few such programs funding four-year degrees (New York’s Excelsior Scholarship being a
notable exception). In all, there are around 300 promise programs across the country.2
The popularity of these free college programs at the state and local levels has led policymakers
to consider free college programs at the federal level. Yet many proposals for a federal
free college program don’t follow the playbook set out by the states (or the plan laid out
by President Biden, who has made free two-year college a key part of his higher education
agenda). Most state-based free college programs are last-dollar scholarships, meaning that
scholarship funding kicks in only after all other grant aid is dispersed. This allows states to
provide a free community college education at a relatively low expense because federal support
already picks up most of the tab for low-income students. The plans touted by progressive
members of Congress, on the other hand, are first-dollar programs that would require states
to fully cover tuition before accounting for other aid, grants, and scholarships. The goal is to
ensure that federal funding goes to cover living expenses for students, but implementation
would come at a significant cost to many states.

Promise Programs During COVID-19
The performance of promise programs during the COVID-19 pandemic is instructive. The
pandemic strained promise programs even though states do not shoulder the full burden of the
program costs. Budget uncertainty in the early days of the pandemic even caused some states
to make cuts or significant changes to their programs.3 The Oregon legislature, for example,
cut the state’s promise by $3.6 million—and the cuts came after the free tuition awards were
sent out, meaning the state had to revoke awards already given to students. Around 1,000
Oregon students lost their free community college tuition. Maryland’s appropriations to
support the state’s two-year free college program have declined from $15 million two years
ago to $8 million today. After disbursing all $8 million, 2,880 students were still on the
waiting list.
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Unlike every other state program, the well-known Tennessee Promise program is funded by an
endowment developed from state lottery funds and is not reliant on state appropriations. The
program’s $600 million endowment, most of which is invested in the stock market, rebounded
after a dip at the beginning of the pandemic. And it is a good thing it did—total enrollment in
the program is up 6% over last year. But Tennessee’s example is difficult to replicate, as few
programs have been built with such sustained bipartisan support, and few state legislatures have
the appetite to set aside hundreds of millions of tax dollars into an endowment. For every stable
Tennessee Promise, there is a volatile Oregon Promise—how a state funds its promise program
and the state’s economic conditions lead to very different outcomes across states.

Picking “Winners” and “Losers” in Designing
a National Free College Program
The simplicity of free college makes it an appealing idea—but the devil is in the details.
The design of the Tennessee Promise makes it fiscally stable, but program design at the federal
level needs to focus on equity concerns across states and students, as well as on financial
feasibility over the next generation. The truth is, not everyone wins in a federal free college
program. These programs will have differential effects on people with different incomes and
on states with differing levels of support for higher education. Those who most need financial
support for college may instead get the smallest subsidy. Those states that spend the least on
higher education would stand to gain the most under a federal free college program. And those
who do not go to college will pay a portion of the tax bill. There are clear winners and losers in
every free college program.

States that invest in higher education, lose. Those that spend less, win.
Using federal dollars to zero out tuition at public institutions counterintuitively rewards states
that have chosen to appropriate smaller sums for public higher education and punishes states that
more amply fund their public universities. In the 2018-19 academic year, the national average net
tuition revenue at public universities for full-time equivalent students was $6,902.4 Using federal
dollars to zero out tuition payments would require that sum per student to be set aside from the
national tax base. Any state that receives more than that amount would get a net transfer from the
tax base—that is, from other states.
Senator Bernie Sanders’ original plan from 2016 called for states to finance one-third of the
amount, with the federal government picking up the other two-thirds of the tab.5 Using Sanders’
percentages, Figure 1 shows the states that would be net winners under this arrangement, in order
from greatest net positive transfer at the top of the graph (Vermont—Senator Sanders’ home
state) to greatest net negative transfer at the bottom (Florida).
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North Carolina and Virginia offer an instructive example of the political cleavages involved in
implementing a national free college infrastructure. Virginia behaves “badly” relative to North
Carolina, in that the Old Dominion appropriates only $5,701 per student to educate its 303,000
students. North Carolina, by contrast, appropriates $9,018 per student to educate its 392,000
students. Because net tuition at Virginia’s public colleges is so much higher ($9,720 versus
$4,769), the state would get back almost $2,000 more per student than its share of the tax base
(assuming that the federal government paid two-thirds of the cost). Meanwhile, North Carolina
would be a net loser, receiving over $1,000 less than its per-student share of the tax base.
The political calculus of using federal dollars to eliminate public tuition is complex and
doesn’t always fall along traditional partisan lines. The winners include blue states like
Vermont and Massachusetts, purple states like New Hampshire and Michigan, and red states
like South Carolina and Indiana. But a large number of blue and purple states also lose in this
scenario. California is a blue state loser. Because of its sheer size it will pull in substantial
revenues, though less than the state’s per-student share of the tax base. Washington and
New Mexico are also blue net losers, along with electorally important battleground states like
Florida, North Carolina, and Wisconsin.
This calculus is further complicated if states must pay a percentage of the cost. Net winner
states are those that appropriate the least for higher education. These states will have to shift
the largest amount of revenues into higher education, or raise taxes the most, to pay their
share of the cost of free college. But these are the very states that have revealed over many
years that they prioritize other things over higher education. Another cleavage is demographic.
Other things equal, states with a larger percentage of young people in the college-age cohort
will win, and states with older populations will lose. Because of these divides, building a
coalition to pass a free college proposal out of Congress may require an impossible degree of
bipartisanship (or an unfortunate amount of logrolling).

The political calculus of using federal dollars to
eliminate public tuition is complex and doesn’t
always fall along traditional partisan lines.
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Figure 1: Net “Winning” and “Losing” States in a National Free College Program
Vermont

$13,054
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Oregon
South Carolina
Virginia

WINNERS
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West Virginia
Oklahoma
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-$4,378

Source: Authors’ calculations using SHEEO State Higher Education Finance dataset, 2019.

[ 6 ]

Broad-access institutions that are already under-resourced stand to lose the
most revenue.
Federalizing the financing of today’s tuition revenues would almost surely exacerbate the
underfunding of public higher education by states. State funding for higher education is only
now recovering from its Great Recession decline. State funding per student was over $500 higher
in 2008 than it is today, and over $1,200 higher at its peak in 2001 (in 2019 dollars). In tough
economic times, states often choose to reduce investment in higher education, and with the
grudging support of state legislatures, public institutions often respond in subsequent years by
raising tuition and seeking out higher-paying out-of-state and international students.
To hold down the cost of a federal free college program, Congress would likely fix its subsidy
commitment over time. Yet the cost of education is not fixed. Like most personal services from
dental care to child daycare, the cost of providing higher education tends to grow more rapidly
than inflation, and states that participate will no longer be able to use the tuition lever to add
revenues to university budgets.6 Given the rising demands of health care, K-12 education,
infrastructure, and other public needs, states are unlikely to change their basic postures
toward higher education. The effect of revenue shortfalls likely will be concentrated at
institutions that currently spend the least—schools like community colleges and broad access
public universities that serve the nation’s most vulnerable students and have little access to
private funds. This could have consequences for student outcomes, including graduation rates,
since state support for higher education is closely linked with college completion.7

Rich students would get richer while low-income and non-traditional students
would still face an affordability gap.
Much of the benefit of universally setting tuition and fees to zero will go to high-income
families that have no financial need.8 Over the past three decades, families in the nation’s
top income quintile have experienced earnings growth that has far outpaced increases in list
price tuition, while lower-income families have seen rising tuition eat away at their earnings
gains. Families at the top of the income distribution also own the bulk of the nation’s financial
assets, and their children tend to graduate debt-free already. The Biden higher education plan
would condition free college on family incomes less than $125,000. The plan would likely tie
federal grants to states for free college programs to the income cap as a condition of receiving
that federal support. Most other free college plans have no such income cap, preferring the
simplicity of a universal free college approach—and recent estimates suggest that up to onethird of a blanket free college subsidy could go to students whose family incomes exceed
$120,000 per year, compared with only 8% to families making under $35,000.9
This means that even if free college becomes a reality, lower-income families and older,
independent students will still struggle to afford the remaining costs of attendance. For
many students, room and board, books, transportation, and foregone wages are many times
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higher than the tuition and fees that they pay. For families in the lower half of the income
distribution, purchasing an education is more like buying a house than like paying an electric
bill. Unlike wealthier households with significant savings, they cannot afford to write a check
to cover college expenses. When increases in college costs are not fully offset by new aid
from the state or federal government or from colleges themselves, the educational door to
advancement begins to close.
Lastly, free college also poses its own set of equity issues. College students are already heavily
subsidized relative to young people who go into the trades and are likely to earn less over their
working lifetime than most college graduates. Free college programs that target traditional
higher education opportunities risk shifting would-be apprentices towards community college
regardless of labor market needs or program fit.

A New Affordability Compact for the Next Generation
Republicans and Democrats alike want a higher education system that acts as a true engine
of social mobility. To achieve that goal, we need targeted programs that improve access,
affordability, and success. A good set of programs also needs to be cost effective and politically
feasible in a world of slim majorities and limited resources. Here are four suggestions for
Congress based on those criteria:

1. Expand Pell Grants to target aid to low- and middle-income families.
While free college programs finance all students, an enlarged Pell Grant program would target
low- and middle-income families. It expands access without subsidizing the wealthy. The
Biden administration’s proposed $1,400 increase in the Pell maximum is a down payment
toward a larger Pell expansion. We support a larger increase and believe it should be nested
within a broader package of policies that enhance college access while also supporting student
success once enrolled.
Over half of all Pell recipients have annual family incomes of less than $20,000 per year, and
over 80% come from families earning less than $40,000.10 As part of increasing the maximum
Pell Grant, the eligibility formula could also be adjusted to allow more families in the middle of
the income distribution to receive some grant support. In addition to improving affordability
for middle-income families, this would help solidify political support for the program in a
similar manner to free college ideas. More Pell support could also reduce borrowing for lower
and middle-income families, or help these students match at colleges with a higher cost of
attendance that better meet their needs. And as a first-dollar program, any Pell money a
student receives above tuition charged can be used to cover other costs of attendance—which
include tuition, room and board charges, books, and other expenses. This is an especially
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important feature for low-income students who attend low-tuition community colleges and
regional public universities and for whom non-tuition costs are often the main barrier to
accessing the higher education system.
An expanded Pell Grant also offers students more educational options. One of the great
features of the Pell Grant is that it travels with the student to any accredited higher education
institution to defray the cost of attendance. In contrast, most free college programs cover only
tuition at state chartered public institutions. Pell Grants, therefore, can provide students with
a more resource-rich set of educational opportunities than a limited free college program.
A private university may be a better curricular or personal match for a student’s interests
than a public institution, and many such institutions admit more students and have higher
completion rates than their public counterparts.
Table 1: Comparison of Wingate University and University of North Carolina at Charlotte

WINGATE UNIVERSITY

UNC CHARLOTTE

(Private Non-Profit)

(Public)

Admission Rate

89%

65%

Average SAT Score

1130

1260

2,592

23,914

Percentage of Pell Recipients

30%

32%

Four-Year Graduation Rate

41%

29%

50.5%

54.8%

Average Net Price

$23,875

$20,267

Average Loan Debt

$27,480

$27,664

Loan Default Rate

4.2%

5.7%

Number of Undergraduates

Six-Year Graduation Rate

Source: CollegeSimply.com

For example, UNC Charlotte is a large public university with almost 24,000 undergraduates.
Wingate University is a small private institution on the outskirts of Charlotte serving fewer than
2,600 students. The average net price of attendance is similar at the two institutions, and they
serve roughly equal percentages of Pell recipients (32% versus 30%). Wingate is less selective (and
therefore more accessible) than UNC Charlotte. Wingate has a higher four-year graduation rate,
while UNC Charlotte has a slightly higher six-year graduation rate. Students at both institutions
leave with almost identical levels of loan debt. A low-income student should be able to choose
which institution better meets their needs.
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Like free college ideas, a significant Pell expansion can raise equity considerations. For many
students attending community colleges and low-tuition public institutions, college is already
tuition-free since the existing Pell maximum exceeds the list price tuition and fees—meaning
low-income students can use excess funds for food and housing. On the other hand, young
people who forego college do not receive similar subsidies and are likely to experience longterm income insecurity at higher rates than their college-going peers. Congress could address
this potential equity issue directly by enlarging the reach of programing and investment under
the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA).

2. Encourage a federal-state partnership that rewards states
that invest in higher education.
Using federal money to make public universities tuition-free is a form of a federal/state
partnership. But it must not perversely reward states that have lowered their own investment in
their higher education systems and pushed the cost of college onto families. A good federal-state
partnership proposal would instead reward states that currently behave well, while encouraging
those that currently put very few resources into public higher education to do more. Any state
that appropriates at least a certain amount per full-time student could become eligible for a
federal grant, with additional incentives to help states transition from low appropriation to higher
appropriation levels.
Congress should consider these three elements in any partnership program it develops:

•

Maintenance of effort. New federal dollars for higher education cannot simply displace
money that states are currently spending. Any partnership agreement should require
states that participate not to reduce current higher education appropriations once the
federal money begins to flow.

•

Block grants. Federal money should go to the states as block grants, allowing the states
to determine the best allocation of funds among competing priorities within its higher
education system, without being overly prescriptive.

•

Safe harbor. Safe harbor provisions allow states to temporarily set aside rules like
the maintenance of effort provisions when the economic weather turns stormy. The
impact of COVID-19 on state budgets offers a clear demonstration of the importance of
countercyclical federal support for state budgets in an economic contraction. A federalstate partnership should never pull resources out of higher education during an economic
downturn. The safe harbor provision could also become a higher education stabilizer if
the size of the block grant is adjusted upward whenever a state’s economy experiences
negative growth. As the economy recovers, states should be required to fully restore
any cuts made during the downturn or face penalties for not returning to pre-recession
appropriations levels.
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3. Provide a Pell top-off subsidy to under-resourced, high-impact
institutions that work with the nation’s low-income students.
Resources matter for retention and completion, and students at any level of preparedness tend
to be more successful in an institution with more educational resources.11 America’s higher
education system is extremely stratified. Highly selective colleges and universities spend three
to ten times as much per student on instruction, student support, and academic support as the
nation’s less selective public and private colleges.12 Yet open-enrollment and minimally selective
schools are where the majority of the nation’s lower-income and first-generation students go
to college. Institutions accepting over 75% of their applicants account for 70% of all Pell Grant
recipient enrollment.13 These students tend to have lower levels of college readiness and a greater
need for instructional spending and student support services. Free college plans would likely
exacerbate this problem over time by starving higher education systems of resources.
The federal government could help these under-resourced institutions by offering a Pell
top-off subsidy that non-profit institutions could add to their operating budgets.14 This idea
shares features with President Biden’s “Title 1 for Higher Education” proposal that Third Way
championed in 2018.15 The subsidy should be based on the number of Pell dollars the school takes
in, not the number of Pell students enrolled. Rewarding schools for taking a high share of Pelleligible students encourages institutions to attract students who qualify for the Pell label, but
who qualify for very little Pell money—in other words, the better-off Pell families. Institutional
eligibility should depend on exhibiting greater than some minimum percentage of Pell-eligible
students. Institutions should also be able to show that they serve low-income students well
(through benchmarks like graduation rates, cohort default, and post-college earnings). The
subsidy should also begin to phase out as the institution’s endowment per student passes a
certain threshold level. These eligibility requirements would reduce the fiscal footprint of the
program (likely around $2 billion per year) while giving universities the incentive to seek out,
enroll, and support low-income students through their time in college.

4. Craft an accountability framework that focuses on improving
outcomes for students.
Our first three proposals require an increased federal investment in higher education, so Congress
and the public should reasonably expect colleges and universities to be held accountable for how
effectively they use new resources. Yet successful accountability policies are difficult to construct,
and bad policies often give schools perverse incentives.16 We recommend crafting accountability
guidelines that emphasize student outcomes, apply to all institutions, offer positive incentives
to more schools than just those close to the edge of the failing border, and are difficult for
institutions to game.
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Emphasizing outcomes does not lead the regulator too deeply into micromanaging the educational
process. Applying outcome measures to all institutions may help build consensus to act since subsectors of the higher education industry are not singled out for differential treatment. Guidelines
that affect very few institutions miss many opportunities to improve behavior across the higher
education system. Together, these components of an integrated accountability framework can help
cement public and political support for a policy package that creates access and facilitates student
success better than a national free college program.
Current federal accountability measures work along two different tracks: providing information
(low stakes) and threatening to revoke access to Title IV funding (high stakes). The College
Affordability and Transparency Center is an example of the first track.17 The government provides
an online repository of information (the College Scorecard) about what families likely will have
to pay at a given school based on their family income, and about outcomes like graduation rates,
student debt, and earnings. This information has significant limitations and must be interpreted
with care, and the extent to which low-income students make good use of the Scorecard is
unclear.18 The Center also compiles so-called “shame lists” of the most expensive institutions,
though recent research suggests that inclusion on such lists had no effect on enrollment.19 Lowstakes informational mechanisms show little promise as standalone accountability measures. The
second accountability track defines numerical targets and punishes schools that fail to meet them
by cutting off access to Pell Grants and federal student loans. The 90/10 rule is a good example.
For-profit institutions are required to take in at least 10% of their revenue from non-Title IV
financial aid sources, such as tuition payments from students and families. This rule is an example
of high stakes accountability, since crossing the line is a death sentence for a college or university,
but it also affects very few schools since it applies only to for-profit institutions that are perilously
close to the borderline.
Risk-sharing is one useful approach for holding colleges and universities accountable for student
debt outcomes.20 At present, the risk of loan default is felt by the taxpayer and by students, who
cannot easily discharge their loans in bankruptcy. If colleges had to repay a small fraction of loan
balances in default, institutions would have an incentive to monitor student borrowing and help
students minimize the likelihood of default. This incentive should apply to all schools, not just
institutions near a failing borderline, and risk-sharing could work in tandem with other earningsbased accountability measures.
Strengthening the federal government’s response to bad actors in higher education can only
increase accountability and improve student outcomes. By restricting student financial aid at
institutions with low graduation rates and abysmal records of ensuring their students can repay
loan balances upon graduation, we can encourage more students to attend the colleges and
universities most likely to help them graduate and help them avoid crippling debt.
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Conclusion
A federal free college program can improve access if it reduces the cost of attendance for students
who would otherwise not seek a postsecondary education. But it would also inefficiently divert
resources to families who have no need. More troubling, any likely federal bargain with the states
to institute a free college program may reduce resource flows to colleges and universities over
time. And spending caps are most likely to affect already under-resourced public institutions
that serve the largest populations of low-income and first-generation students. With limited
resources, higher education policy must target resources to the students with the greatest need
and the institutions that serve them. There are better, more efficient, and more equitable ways to
do this than a universal free college program.
As a nation, we want our higher education system to be accessible to students regardless of their
ability to pay. We want students to succeed, so students should match with the best program for
their needs. And we want higher education to generate social mobility, so federal money should
support institutions that work effectively to help students from disadvantaged backgrounds
achieve their full potential. The complexity of this set of policy proposals is not a bug, but a
feature. Complex policy problems deserve nuanced solutions. While “free college” may fit on a
bumper sticker, the alternative proposals offered here represent a more progressive and efficient
approach to addressing longstanding issues of access—and keep students with the greatest need
at the center of the conversation on college affordability.

David H. Feldman is a Professor of Economics at
William & Mary. He is the author, with Robert B.
Archibald, of the books “Why Does College Cost So
Much?” and “The Road Ahead for America’s Colleges and
Universities,” both published by Oxford University Press.
Christopher R. Marsicano is the Founding Director
of the College Crisis Initiative and Assistant Professor
of Educational Studies and Public Policy at Davidson
College. His research focuses on higher education
finance and policy.

[ 13 ]

Endnotes
1.

2.

3.

 he greatest exception is the Tennessee
T
Promise, which is funded by an endowment
created by the state’s lottery. Annual
lottery revenues are added to returns on the
endowment to provide the operating budget
for the program.
 erna, Laura W., and Elaine W. Leigh.
P
“Understanding the promise: A typology
of state and local college promise
programs.” Educational Researcher, vol. 47
no. 3, 2018, pp. 155-180.
 t. Amour, Madeline. “College
S
Promise Programs Wrestle With
Pandemic Realities.” Inside Higher Ed,
8 Oct. 2020, www.insidehighered.com/
news/2020/10/08/college-promiseprograms-face-cuts-uncertainty-andchanges.

4.

 HEEO data does not separate in-state from
S
non-resident students. Isolating net tuition
for in-state students would slightly alter
the numbers, but it would not change the
larger patterns revealed in Figure 1.

5.

 eldman, David H., and Robert B Archibald.
F
“Why Bernie Sanders’s free college plan
doesn’t make sense.” The Washington
Post, 22 Apr. 2016, www.washingtonpost.
com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/04/22/
why-bernie-sanderss-free-college-plandoesnt-make-sense/.

6.

7.

 rchibald, Robert B., and David H. Feldman.
A
“Drivers of the Rising Price of a College
Education.” Midwestern Higher Education
Compact, 2018.
 itus, Marvin A. “No college student left
T
behind: The influence of financial aspects
of a state’s higher education policy on
college completion.” The Review of Higher
Education, vol. 29, no. 3, 2006, pp. 293-317.

8.

 aum, Sandy, and Sarah Turner.
B
“‘Free tuition’ is the opposite of
progressive policymaking.” The
Washington Post, 3 May 2019, www.
washingtonpost.com/outlook/freetuition-is-the-opposite-of-progressivepolicymaking/2019/05/03/4767edc8-6c1b11e9-a66d-a82d3f3d96d5_story.html.

9.

 aum, Sandy, and Alexandra Tilsey.
B
“Pricing ‘Free College.’” The Urban Institute,
3 May 2019, www.urban.org/urban-wire/
pricing-free-college.

10.

 ata source: Federal Pell Program Annual
D
Report, 2017-2018, www2.ed.gov/finaid/
prof/resources/data/pell-data.html.

11.

 eming, David J., and Christopher R.
D
Walters. “The impact of state budget cuts
on US postsecondary attainment.” Draft,
Harvard University, 2018; Chetty, Raj, et al.
“Income segregation and intergenerational
mobility across colleges in the United
States.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
vol. 135, no. 3, 2020, pp 1567-1633.

12.

 oxby, Caroline M. “The dramatic
H
economics of the us market for higher
education.” The 8th Annual Martin Feldstein
Lecture, National Bureau of Economic
Research, 2016.

13.

 uthors’ calculation based on IPEDS data
A
on Pell enrollment and overall admission
rates for 6,251 Title IV aid eligible
postsecondary institutions.

14.

This top-off idea appeared in The
Road Ahead for America’s Colleges and
Universities, by Robert B. Archibald and
David H. Feldman (2017). See chapter 11,
pp. 245-46.

[ 14 ]

15.

 chwartz, Natalie. “Biden has proposed
S
Title I for colleges. Here’s what that could
look like.” Higher Ed Dive, 20 Nov. 2020,
www.highereddive.com/news/biden-hasproposed-title-i-for-colleges-hereswhat-that-could-look-like/589514/;
Hiler, Tamara, and Wesley Whistle.
“Creating a ‘Title I’ for Higher Ed.” Third
Way, 13 Dec. 2018, www.thirdway.org/
memo/creating-a-title-i-for-higher-ed.

16.

 elchen, Robert. Higher Education
K
Accountability. JHU Press, 2018.

17.

 S Department of Education. “College
U
Affordability and Transparency Center,”
collegecost.ed.gov.

18.

 urwitz, Michael, and Jonathan Smith.
H
“Student Responsiveness to Earnings Data
in the College Scorecard.”Economic Inquiry,
vol. 56, issue 2, 2018, pp. 1220-1243.

19.

 aker, Dominique J. ““Name and Shame”:
B
An Effective Strategy for College Tuition
Accountability?” Educational Evaluation
and Policy Analysis, vol. 42, no.3, 2020, pp
393-416.

20.

Webber, Douglas A. Risk-sharing in higher
education: A policy proposal. No. 141. IZA
Policy Paper, 2018.

21.

Snyder, T.D., de Brey, C., and Dillow, S.A.
(2019). Digest of Education Statistics 2018
(NCES 2020-009). National Center for
Education Statistics, Institute of Education
Sciences, US Department of Education.
Washington, DC.

[ 15 ]

